“一帶一路”：PPP模式如何發(fā)揮作用？
2017-12-27
“一帶一路”速覽
a.陸地和海上通道
b.60多個國家、三個大洲
c.以6個交通走廊為中心
d. 涉及全球65%的人口和35%的GDP
e.目標包括減少貿(mào)易壁壘、推進設(shè)施和人口的互聯(lián)、金融一體化和政策協(xié)調(diào)
作為中國政府的一項重要戰(zhàn)略，“一帶一路”戰(zhàn)略謀求恢復中國連接亞洲、歐洲和非洲的傳統(tǒng)貿(mào)易路線，促進沿線60多個國家、覆蓋全球三分之二人口和三分之一GDP區(qū)域的經(jīng)濟活動和聯(lián)系。
中國在不同的“一帶一路”國家的投資很可能會以不同形式進行。本文著重介紹為何政府和社會資本合作（PPP）模式在“一帶一路”沿線國家的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施項目中能夠發(fā)揮核心作用，并列出在“一帶一路”戰(zhàn)略中成功實施PPP模式應具備的條件。
PPP模式可為中國和“一帶一路”沿線國家提供獨一無二的在降低政府財政負擔的基礎(chǔ)上發(fā)展基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施項目的機遇。在為“一帶一路”沿線國家當?shù)厮綘I領(lǐng)域創(chuàng)造長期發(fā)展平臺的同時，該模式可以確保東道國政府“投入”項目和項目可靠性，為中國出口專業(yè)技術(shù)、商品和服務(wù)提供渠道。
為項目選擇PPP模式
如前所述，為實現(xiàn)中國作為“一帶一路”發(fā)起國、其他東道國政府以及其他市場參與方（包括股權(quán)投資人、融資方和承包商）的目標，根據(jù)相關(guān)行業(yè)的經(jīng)營和戰(zhàn)略重要性，PPP的執(zhí)行方式可能是多種多樣的。PPP不是一個“一刀切”的模式。例如，如主要目標是通過吸引社會資本來降低政府財政負擔（這是英國PPP模式的主要驅(qū)動因素），則BOT/BOO模式比簡單的服務(wù)合同模式更好，因為服務(wù)合同模式下資本投入仍然是公共機構(gòu)的責任。如主要目標是轉(zhuǎn)移風險，則特許權(quán)模式可能是更合適的選擇，澳大利亞多個收費公路項目都采用了這一模式。但是，如東道國政府希望保持對服務(wù)或資產(chǎn)的控制權(quán)或每隔幾年可以對私營機構(gòu)重新評估或重新進行安排，則服務(wù)/管理合同或租賃安排可能是更合適的選擇。
為滿足政府在項目實施中對透明度越來越高的要求，成熟PPP市場越來越多地采用合資公司模式。在“一帶一路”背景下，合資公司可作為中國的替代投資方式，該模式同時可降低對東道國政府信用的顧慮，可以鼓勵有意與中國知名企業(yè)共同投資的第三方股權(quán)投資人（無論是來自中國還是其他國家）參與項目。
東道國政府和雙邊投資協(xié)定的作用
PPP模式的共性是社會資本參與方與出讓服務(wù)/管理合同或授予BOT或特許權(quán)的政府機關(guān)共同發(fā)揮重要作用。如政府機關(guān)或東道國政府為獲得項目股權(quán)設(shè)立合資公司，則又增添了一層含義。
雖然中國是“一帶一路”戰(zhàn)略的總發(fā)起人，但在“一帶一路”沿線國家實施PPP項目仍需要東道國政府的相關(guān)機構(gòu)積極參與，包括負責為東道國政府籌集向私營機構(gòu)付款資金的財政部。PPP模式的“合作”因素也因此在“一帶一路”戰(zhàn)略中具有更廣的含義，包括中國與相關(guān)東道國政府以及相關(guān)東道國政府機關(guān)與合作的私營機構(gòu)之間的關(guān)系。我們將在下文“東道國政府的投入和可靠性”章節(jié)進一步闡述。
為確保東道國政府合作和積極參與，中國政府在雙邊投資協(xié)定方面已經(jīng)取得了顯著進展。確保上述協(xié)定適應“一帶一路”戰(zhàn)略的寬度和廣度對各方都大有裨益。
適用不同資產(chǎn)類型的PPP模式
PPP模式已運用于世界范圍內(nèi)的多種類型項目，包括道路、橋梁、隧道、鐵路、港口、機場和寬帶服務(wù)等經(jīng)濟基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施，也包括社會保障住房、學校、醫(yī)院、監(jiān)獄、水務(wù)、廢物處理和國防設(shè)施等社會/公共基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施。在一定程度上，在上述領(lǐng)域?qū)嵤㏄PP模式是自我選擇的結(jié)果：租賃合同和特許權(quán)模式在吸引特定用戶付款的經(jīng)濟基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施（如港口、機場和收費公路）中更易實施，而服務(wù)/管理合同和各種形式的BOT安排在更廣泛的經(jīng)濟和社會領(lǐng)域中可以得到運用。
如上文所述，具體項目的合同安排可根據(jù)中國、相關(guān)東道國政府和社會資本的要求進行相應調(diào)整。
PPP的優(yōu)點
1.降低財政負擔
?。?）使用社會資本
無論項目資金成本的大小，吸引社會資本投資都可以降低中國和/或東道國政府的資金承諾，并刺激商業(yè)債務(wù)市場的資金供應。雖然上述優(yōu)點在BOT或特許權(quán)PPP模式中最為明顯（可以促使社會資本提供大額的初期開發(fā)費用），服務(wù)/管理合同或租賃安排也可以釋放流動資金、確保服務(wù)的成本確定性，從而協(xié)助東道國政府對預算的管理。
通過(a)吸引社會資本；以及(b)向東道國政府轉(zhuǎn)移大部分資金負擔（如根據(jù)服務(wù)/管理合同或BOT模式，東道國政府將負責向私營機構(gòu)支付提供相關(guān)服務(wù)的費用），中國規(guī)模巨大的“一帶一路”投資可以通過PPP模式得以深化。
長遠來看，利用社會資本還可以推動東道國金融市場的發(fā)展。
?。?）社會資本規(guī)律
利用社會資本的優(yōu)點不僅在于可以提供資金。外部融資方的參與可能會創(chuàng)造良好的合同結(jié)構(gòu)，以確保(a)按時、按預算和按標準交付相關(guān)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施；以及(b)項目良好運營、嚴格的盡職調(diào)查以及在項目期內(nèi)信息提供的及時性。私人債權(quán)和股權(quán)融資人推動PPP順利完成的動機將其利益與中國和“一帶一路”合作伙伴的利益統(tǒng)一起來。
?。?）東道國信用狀況
由于很多“一帶一路”國家是發(fā)展中的經(jīng)濟體，對社會資本及其融資方來說東道國政府的信用狀況可能是一個問題。通過在合同期內(nèi)分攤東道國政府的付款義務(wù)，PPP模式一定程度上緩解了這一問題。中國還可能可以提供擔?；蚱渌庞弥С?，進一步降低社會資本投資“一帶一路”國家的障礙。
通過提供信用支持和保險產(chǎn)品、設(shè)立項目結(jié)構(gòu)份額，多邊金融機構(gòu)在協(xié)助東道國政府以對社會資本而言可融資/可投資的方式實施項目，進而管理發(fā)展中國家的風險方面一直很活躍。中國也可以采用類似方式，例如通過亞洲基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施投資銀行參與項目。盡管亞洲基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施投資銀行不是“一帶一路”的正式組成部分，但可以為“一帶一路”的成功實施發(fā)揮重要作用。
?。?）中國的角色
減少對中國“一帶一路”預算的依賴還可以令中國和中國公司投資項目的渠道多元化。政府間資助的模式導致中國扮演了項目發(fā)起人的角色，承受大量投資風險。如采用PPP模式，前期資金成本由社會資本承擔，東道國政府負責持續(xù)支付服務(wù)費用，而中國可選擇通過直接向項目提供商業(yè)貸款、股權(quán)投資、提供信用支持或結(jié)構(gòu)性支持等方式參與，或?qū)⒆陨淼慕巧抻谕扑]中國承包商。這樣一來，PPP模式可催生貿(mào)易和資本投資活動并為中國的產(chǎn)能打開大門，同時，利用PPP模式獲得社會資本和東道國政府的長期收入流使得中國可以將自身“一帶一路”戰(zhàn)略的預算投資于更多國家和地區(qū)。
2.有效的風險分攤
在PPP模式下，設(shè)計、建設(shè)、完工和運營風險分別由最有能力管理上述風險的當事方承擔。特別是在發(fā)展中的“一帶一路”國家，東道國政府機關(guān)可能不具有必要的長期項目管理能力，而（當?shù)?、中國或者第三國的）社會資本有，因此，與項目交付相關(guān)的風險應向社會資本轉(zhuǎn)移。這種模式下，由具有能力管理該風險的當事方來管理或吸收風險，可以更經(jīng)濟的方式定價和降低成本，中國和其“一帶一路”的合作伙伴可以實現(xiàn)價值最大化。
PPP項目前期融資階段進行的全周期分析也將鼓勵當事方在一開始就尋找令所有參與方滿意的全面的技術(shù)和商業(yè)風險解決方案，必然有助于降低項目的整體成本。
3.東道國政府投入和可靠性
無論采用何種模式，東道國政府的支持和承諾對于“一帶一路”戰(zhàn)略的成功都至關(guān)重要。通過要求政府重視和取得服務(wù)所有權(quán)，PPP模式提高了政府通過合作方式“投入”相關(guān)服務(wù)的可能性。政府機關(guān)設(shè)定服務(wù)規(guī)范和標準，并通過招標程序評估私營機構(gòu)達成相關(guān)要求的能力。在收到私營機構(gòu)的反饋后，政府還可以對上述要求進行變更。
在指定中標人后，政府可以通過合同條款（包括收取損害賠償金和扣減合同款）確保其要求得以執(zhí)行。相應的，政府需要對制定的規(guī)范和標準（及其執(zhí)行情況）、選擇合作的私營機構(gòu)以及支付服務(wù)款項承擔責任。
受益于其管理大型項目的豐富經(jīng)驗，中國可以與東道國政府（特別是發(fā)展中“一帶一路”國家）協(xié)商進一步完善項目流程。這將為政策協(xié)調(diào)、政治合作以及人員和設(shè)施的互聯(lián)提供一個平臺，實現(xiàn)“一帶一路”的目標。
4.出口
通過PPP模式，中國可以在“一帶一路”項目中發(fā)揮除提供資金以外的重要作用。如：
a.在項目采購、交付和運營階段向“一帶一路”國家提供其大型項目管理的知識和經(jīng)驗；
b.提供商品和服務(wù)（包括作為項目產(chǎn)品和設(shè)備的供應商）；以及
c.最重要的，通過作為項目承包商的中國企業(yè)提供專業(yè)技術(shù)。
d.除令中國的出口更加多元以及釋放中國的產(chǎn)能并幫助中國企業(yè)“走出去”外，PPP模式還將加快中國從生產(chǎn)型國家向服務(wù)型國家的轉(zhuǎn)化過程。
5.利用社會資本的能力
PPP模式的核心是最大限度地利用社會資本的能力。這一特性對于“一帶一路”國家投入項目以及通過利用本地資源實現(xiàn)經(jīng)濟乘數(shù)效應至關(guān)重要。中國完全能夠通過輸出其豐富的專業(yè)技術(shù)能力彌補東道國的能力缺陷，為長期協(xié)商和合作奠定堅實的基礎(chǔ)。
6.外商投資限制
中國投資項目面臨的一個實際問題是一些“一帶一路”國家對外資持股的限制。PPP模式可以變更項目投資的性質(zhì)，從而解決這一問題，并且使東道國政府無需在吸引中國資金和放寬對外商投資的限制之間做出艱難選擇。
7.靈活性
如上文所述，PPP模式在私營機構(gòu)資本投資、風險分攤、回報方式以及中國在項目中的作用等方面有靈活性。靈活性是PPP模式的主要優(yōu)點之一。
8.標準化
從中長期而言，PPP模式可以為“一帶一路”國家和整個“一帶一路”走廊的發(fā)展模式、風險分攤、政府出資模式、社會資本融資結(jié)構(gòu)、擔保安排、合同文本和爭議解決提供標準化平臺。標準化在英國和澳大利亞等成熟PPP市場已基本實現(xiàn)，改善了項目的成本和時間效率。同樣，采用PPP模式可加速中國和東道國政府實現(xiàn)“一帶一路”目標的進程。
PPP模式的成功因素
為實現(xiàn)PPP模式可帶來的利益，中國和“一帶一路”國家需要合作，確保具備成功實施PPP模式所需的關(guān)鍵條件。
盡管根據(jù)國別或資產(chǎn)類型不同，需要搭建的架構(gòu)或者面臨的挑戰(zhàn)可能存在差異，但PPP項目的主要成功因素包括：
1.合適的國家、行業(yè)和項目
為實現(xiàn)“一帶一路”目標，需要認真選擇實施PPP模式的國家、行業(yè)和項目。如某個“一帶一路”國家沒有成功實施PPP項目的長期記錄，則應該選擇有當?shù)卣嬷С值暮唵蔚捻椖?，而不選擇復雜的項目。簡單的項目也會緩解參與PPP項目的東道國政府、社會資本和中國政府機關(guān)的壓力，以便在開展更復雜的PPP項目前更加熟悉和了解PPP模式。在項目實施中，建立可信度非常重要。
2.合適的PPP模式
任何PPP項目的成功很大程度上取決于PPP模式的選擇。在決策過程中必須具有靈活性，不拘泥于任何一個PPP模式，不斷審查項目實施的目標，確保在PPP模式的選擇中反映項目的變化。
3.目標明確
應花時間確定項目的參數(shù)、規(guī)范和標準，項目是否成功只應根據(jù)上述參數(shù)、規(guī)范和標準進行衡量。一個國家的一個項目的錯誤評估可能會對后續(xù)項目產(chǎn)生不利影響。
4.合理的風險分攤
PPP結(jié)構(gòu)中被廣泛認可的原則是，風險應由最有能力管理相關(guān)風險的一方承擔。不恰當?shù)娘L險轉(zhuǎn)移可能會導致私營機構(gòu)將其轉(zhuǎn)嫁到定價上，對PPP的價值產(chǎn)生不利影響。此外，還可能增加私營機構(gòu)違約和項目終止的風險。最后，無論是哪一方的過錯，如項目由于私營機構(gòu)無力管理相關(guān)風險而失敗，所有參與方將蒙受聲譽損失。
法律和監(jiān)管因素：“一帶一路”國家需要考慮的相關(guān)因素包括：
1.土地權(quán)利
土地權(quán)利的重要性取決于項目是否土地密集型項目以及項目選擇的PPP模式。對于租賃型安排、BOT/BOO和特許權(quán)模式而言，私營機構(gòu)及其融資方需要確保土地進入權(quán)和使用權(quán)(a)有足夠確定性；(b)不會被隨意收回；以及(c)（如需）可以向分包商和融資方轉(zhuǎn)讓。
2.資產(chǎn)擔保
為了以具有競爭力的條款吸引融資，私營機構(gòu)需要說服融資方其能夠取得合適的擔保和信用支持，包括土地以及相關(guān)項目權(quán)益和項目資產(chǎn)上的擔保（或類似權(quán)利）。融資方還需要確認(a)其可以始終保持相對于無擔保債權(quán)人或低順位債權(quán)人的優(yōu)先性；(b)在發(fā)生違約時可強制執(zhí)行擔保；以及(c) 在獲得承認的其他司法轄區(qū)獲得的判決能夠強制執(zhí)行。
3.貸款人介入權(quán)
當?shù)胤珊晚椖课募€需要允許貸款人有介入的權(quán)利，可以在觸發(fā)項目終止權(quán)之前保護其投資。
4.終止賠償/政府擔保
為確保項目具有商業(yè)可融資性/可投資性，東道國政府可能需要同意在項目因特定情況終止的情況下進行賠償或提供擔保。在某些國家，當?shù)胤刹辉试S這種安排，因此需要針對PPP模式修訂相關(guān)法律（或提供合適的替代方案）。
5.爭議解決
當?shù)胤杀仨氃试S選擇合適的爭議解決機制，通常需要在項目合同中增加和強制執(zhí)行‘仲裁協(xié)議’條款，允許在英國等廣泛認可的司法轄區(qū)進行仲裁。能否在東道國強制執(zhí)行仲裁裁決也是融資方和承包商的主要考慮因素。
6.PPP部門
雖然并非必備條件，但在東道國政府設(shè)立管理PPP模式的PPP部門將有助于確保執(zhí)行一致性和提高執(zhí)行的確定性，同時為中國的協(xié)商和政策協(xié)調(diào)提供聯(lián)系人。PPP部門還可適時制訂明確的采購流程，推進程序的標準化，提高效率。
7.有經(jīng)驗的顧問
根據(jù)項目地點和資產(chǎn)類型，PPP模式的成功實施還可能需要獲得專業(yè)技術(shù)、財務(wù)、保險和法律顧問的意見。專業(yè)顧問的參與通常是吸引有競爭力的社會資本參與的必要條件。在東道國擁有相關(guān)經(jīng)驗前，中國和其他更發(fā)達的經(jīng)濟體是提供上述經(jīng)驗主要渠道，東道國政府需要承認其重要性并降低相關(guān)顧問參與的門檻（包括簽證和工作許可等）。
One Belt One Road: How can PPPs help?
Cliffordchance
OBOR snapshot
· Land and sea based.
· 60+ countries, 3 continents.
· Centred around 6 transport corridors.
· Access to more than 65% of global population and 35% of global GDP.
· Objectives include reducing trade impediments, facilitating connectivity of facilities and people, financial integration and policy co-ordination.
One Belt One Road (OBOR) is a key initiative of the Chinese government and seeks to restore the country’s old trade routes into other parts of Asia, Europe and Africa, while boosting economic activity and connectivity within a vast region encompassing more than 60 countries, two thirds of the world’s population and one third of global GDP.
While Chinese investment within OBOR is likely to take a number of different forms, in this paper we set out the reasons why the public-private partnership (PPP) model could perform a central role in the delivery of infrastructure projects in OBOR countries. We also identify the conditions to be addressed for the successful deployment of the PPP model within OBOR.
PPPs present a unique opportunity for China and other countries within OBOR to procure infrastructure in a manner which reduces the burden on government budgets, may secure host government ’buy in’ and accountability for projects and provides a pathway for Chinese specialist skills, goods and services, while creating a long term platform for the development of local private sector skills in OBOR countries.
Choosing a PPP model for a project
As these differing models show, PPP can be deployed in a number of ways in order to fit the objectives of China as the sponsor of OBOR, and of host governments and market participants including equity investors, financiers and contractors, and to accommodate operational and strategic priorities in the relevant sector. It is not "one size fits all". For example, if the intention is to reduce the burden on government budgets by attracting private capital (a central driver for PPP roll out in the UK), then a BOT/BTO/BOO model may be preferable to a simple service contract (where capital investment remains the responsibility of the public sector). If risk transfer is the primary motivation, a concession PPP model, used in a number of Australian toll road projects, may be more appropriate. If however the host government seeks to maintain overall control over the service or asset, or re-evaluate and re-let private sector arrangements every few years, a service/management contract or lease arrangement may be more suitable.
The joint venture model is increasingly used in established PPP markets to accommodate a desire for the public partner to have greater transparency over the delivery of the project. In the context of OBOR, this model may provide an alternative mode of investment for China while also mitigating any concerns over the credit worthiness of a host government and therefore being a catalyst for the particupation of third party equity investors (whether from China or elsewhere) who may be encouraged to invest alongisde a prominent Chinese entity.
Role of host governments and Bilateral Investment Treaties
The common element across each of these PPP models is the central role played not only by the private sector participant, but also the Authority which is letting the service/management contract or procuring the BOT or concession. An additional element is added to that role if the Authority or host government establishes a joint venture in order to take an equity stake in the project.
Notwithstanding that China is the overall sponsor of OBOR, the deployment of PPPs in OBOR countries will require the active participation of relevant agencies of the host governments, including in particular the Ministry of Finance/Treasury which will be responsible for funding host government payments to the private sector partner. The ’partnership’ element of PPP is therefore given broader meaning in the context of OBOR to encompass the partnership between China and the relevant host government, and that between the relevant host government agency and the appointed private sector partner. We explore this further in ’Host government buy-in and accountability’ below.
To secure the co-operation and active participation of host governments, the progress China has been making in respect of Bilateral Investment Treaties is significant. Ensuring that such treaties accommodate (or evolve to accommodate) the breadth and scale of proposed OBOR initiatives is in the interest of all parties.
PPP model across asset classes
PPP models has been deployed in a number of asset classes throughout the world. These include economic infrastructure such as roads, bridges, tunnels, rail, ports, airports and broadband services, and social/public infrastructure such as social housing, schools, hospitals, prisons, water, waste and defence facilities. To an extent, PPP models deployed across these sectors are self selective: lease contracts and concessions are more easily deployed for economic infrastructure which attracts a specific user payment (e.g. ports, airports and toll roads), whereas service/management contracts and BOT arrangements (in any form) can be procured across a broader range of economic and social assets.
As is clear from the above, however, contractual settings in individual projects can be adapted to meet the particular requirements of China, the relevant host government and the private sector.
Benefits of PPP
In the context of the OBOR, the PPP model offers a number of benefits when compared to traditional procurement models backed by government to government grants extended by China.
Reduce budget burden
Use of private sector capital
Regardless of whether the capital cost of a project is significant, attracting investment from the private sector both limits the capital commitment from China and/or a host government, and facilitates the provision of financing from the commercial debt markets. While these benefits are most apparent in a BOT or concession PPP which facilitates the private sector meeting a high initial cost of development, the procurement of services via a service/management contract or a lease arrangement can also facilitate management of a host government’s operating budget by freeing working capital and providing cost certainty for services.
China’s investment in OBOR, while vast, could be made to go further in this manner by (a) attracting private sector investment and (b) moving a substantial part of the funding burden to the host government which, under a service/management contract or BOT model, will be responsible for making payments to the private sector for the provision of the relevant service.
The use of private capital in this manner will also deepen the financial markets in the host country over the longer term.
Private sector discipline
The benefit of private sector capital is not restricted to the simple availability of monies. The participation of external financiers will likely result in the development of a robust contractual structure which focuses on ensuring (a) the delivery of the relevant infrastructure on time, to budget and to specification, and (b) the optimal operation thereof, strict due diligence during procurement and timely delivery of information during the term of the project. The incentives on private debt and equity financiers to succeed in delivering the PPP align the interests of such financiers with those of China and its OBOR partners.
Host government creditworthiness
Given that a number of OBOR countries are developing economies, the creditworthiness of host governments may be a challenge for private sector participants and their financiers. The PPP model introduces a partial mitigant by allocating the host government’s payment obligations over the period of the relevant contract. China may also be able to provide guarantees or other credit enhancements to further mitigate these barriers to private sector investment in OBOR countries.
Multilateral financial institutions have been particularly active in helping manage these risks in developing economies by offering credit enhancement and insurance products and by creating project structuring units to assist host governments in preparing their procurements in a manner which is bankable/investable from a private sector perspective. China could take a similar approach, including via the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank which, though not formally part of OBOR, could play a key role in the successful execution of OBOR projects.
China’s role
Reducing the reliance on China’s OBOR budget could also diversify the way in which China and Chinese companies contribute to projects. A government to government grant puts China in the role of project sponsor, with broad exposure to the risks of the venture. If, under a PPP, any initial capital costs are met by the private sector and the host government is primarily responsible for ongoing service payments, China can choose to provide commercial debt or equity directly to the project, provide credit enhancement or structuring support as described above or limit itself to procuring roles on the project for Chinese contractors. In this manner, the PPP model can generate trade and capital investment and open up pathways for Chinese productive capacity, while expanding the footprint of China’s OBOR capital budget by leveraging it to access private sector capital and long-term revenue streams from host governments.
Efficiency in risk allocation
PPPs are designed so that design, construction, completion and operational risks are allocated to the party which is best able to manage them. In developing OBOR countries, in particular, where host government bodies may not have the necessary long-term project skills and private sector parties (whether local, Chinese or from a third nation) do, it follows that the risks associated with project delivery should be transferred to the private sector. In so doing, China and its OBOR partners should obtain best value because those with the greatest and most relevant expertise will be best able to manage or absorb the risks, thereby pricing them more economically and minimising cost.
The whole-life analysis central to a PPP project at the pre-financing stage also encourages a comprehensive and holistic approach to finding solutions to technical and commercial risks from the outset in a way that is satisfactory to all participants and which will inevitably serve to reduce overall project costs.
The patronage and commitment of host governments is essential to the success of OBOR, whatever the procurement model used. Each PPP model, however, enhances the prospects of such co-operative ’buy-in’ by requiring the procuring Authority to prioritise, and take ownership of, the service output required. The Authority sets the service specifications and performance standards, and then is put in a position to evaluate competing private sector parties’ capacity to meet those requirements in a bidding process. Changes can also be made to such requirements once private sector feedback is collected.
Once the contract is awarded, the Authority is given the contractual tools to enforce its requirements (including via the levying of liquidated damages or payment deductions). As a consequence, the Authority is accountable for the specifications and standards imposed (and their enforcement), the choice of private sector partner and payment for services provided.
With its vast experience of managing large projects, China can consult with host governments to bring robustness to this process, particularly for developing OBOR countries. This will also provide a platform for the coordination of policy, political co-operation and the connectivity of people and facilities, each a central tenet of OBOR.
Exports
By broadening China’s role beyond the contribution of monies to finance OBOR projects, the PPP model generates a pathway for China to contribute:
a.its knowhow and experience of managing large projects in the procurement, delivery and operations phases to OBOR countries;
b.goods and services, including as a supplier of commodities and equipment to projects; and
c.most importantly, specialist skills, particularly via Chinese entities which may become contractors on such projects.
In addition to diversifying China’s exports and providing an outlet for Chinese productive capacity and enterprise, this will accelerate China’s transition from an economy based on manufacturing to one based on services.
Private sector skills
At its core, the PPP model seeks to maximise the use of private sector skills. This will be important for OBOR countries, not only to ensure community buy-in to projects but also to secure the economic multiplier effects which come with local resources being utilised and rewarded. China would be well placed to fill any skills gaps in host countries by exporting the specialist skills it has in abundance, while building the basis for long term consultation and co-operation.
Foreign ownership
One practical constraint on direct Chinese investment into projects is the foreign ownership restrictions which apply in a number of OBOR countries. The platform which the PPP model provides for China to vary the nature of its contribution to such projects may mitigate this concern, while absolving host governments of the need to make a difficult choice between attracting Chinese patronage and relaxing long-established foreign ownership laws.
Flexibility
As described above, the PPP model offers a range of options for capital investment, risk allocation, compensation of the private sector and for the role China takes on a project. This flexibility is amongst its key strengths.
Standardisation
In the medium to long term, the PPP model offers a platform for the standardisation of procurement models, risk allocation, public sector funding models, private sector financing structures, security arrangements, documentation and dispute resolution within OBOR countries and more broadly throughout OBOR corridors. This standardisation process has occurred to a significant degree in mature PPP markets such as the UK and Australia and has driven cost and time efficiency in the delivery of projects. In the same way, deployment of the PPP model can accelerate the realisation of the ambitions of China and host governments for OBOR.
Success factors for PPPs
For the potential benefits of the PPP model to be delivered, China and its OBOR partners will need to work together to ensure that the key conditions for the successful deployment of PPPs are put in place.
While the specific structures to be put in place and challenges to be overcome will vary from country to country and by reference to asset class, the key success factors for PPPs generally are as follows:
Appropriate countries, sectors and projects: To ensure that OBOR’s momentum is maintained, the countries, sectors and projects for PPPs will need careful consideration. If there is no lengthy track record of successful PPP procurement in an OBOR country, the selection of a simple PPP project which has broad local public support is preferable to struggling with a more complex project. It will also help gently ease the host government, local private sector parties, and Chinese government agencies into the PPP process so that a level of familiarity and proficiency is developed before embarking on more complex PPP projects. In formative procurements, building credibility is key.
Appropriate PPP model: The success of any given PPP project will largely depend upon the selection of a PPP model. Flexibility must be built into the decision-making process so that no single PPP model is necessarily preferred over another, and that the objectives for the procurement are revisited over time to ensure that any changes are reflected in the choice of PPP model.
Clarity of objectives: Time should be taken to establish the parameters, specifications and standards for a project and success should only ever be measured against the same. A misguided evaluation of one project in a country or sector will adversely affect each project to follow.
Reasonable risk allocation: The well-established principle that, in a PPP structure, the risks should be allocated to the party best able to manage those risks, needs to be respected. Inappropriate transfer of risk will likely result in consequential pricing by the private sector, which may adversely affect the PPP’s value for money proposition. It may also increase the risk of private sector default and termination of the project. Ultimately, if the project fails as a result of the private sector’s inability to manage the relevant risk, all participants will suffer reputational damage, wherever the fault lay under the contractual documents.
Legal and regulatory factors: Relevant considerations for the OBOR country include:
Land rights – the relevance of land rights will depend on whether the project is land intensive and the PPP model being used. For lease-type arrangements, BOT/BTO/BOO procurements and concessions, private sector contractors and their financiers will need comfort that land access and use rights are (a) broad, (b) not capable of being summarily withdrawn and (c) where relevant, capable of being assigned to subcontractors and financiers.
Security over assets – in order to attract finance on competitive terms, the private sector will need to be able to get its financiers comfortable that appropriate security and credit support can be granted to financiers, including security (or analogous rights) over land, and over interests in relevant project entities and project assets. Financiers will also need comfort that (a) their priority over unsecured or lower ranking claims is maintained, (b) security can be enforced upon default and (c) judgments obtained in recognised foreign jurisdictions will be enforced.
Lender step-in – local laws and project documentation will need to accommodate lender step-in rights in order to permit lenders to protect their investment prior to any project termination right arising.
Termination compensation / government guarantees – in order for projects to be commercially bankable/investable, the host government will likely need to agree to pay compensation to the private partner upon termination in certain circumstances or provide guarantees. Local laws in some jurisdictions prohibit such arrangements, necesstiating amendments to the law to accommodate PPPs (or appropriate alternative solutions to be put in place).
Dispute resolution – local law must accommodate a recognised dispute resolution regime. Often, this requires the inclusion and enforcement of ’agreement to arbitrate’ provisions in project contracts, and the acceptance of arbitration in an established foreign jurisdiction such as the UK. The ability to enforce such arbitral awards in the host jurisdiction will also be a key consideration for financiers and contractors.
PPP unit – although not a pre-requisite, establishing a PPP unit within host governments to control PPP procurement may provide consistency of approach and build greater certainty of execution, while giving China a focus for its consultation and policy coordination activities. In time, a PPP unit could develop a clear process for procurement and drive the standardisation process to achieve efficiency.
Experienced advisors: The successful implementation of a PPP may, depending on location and asset class, require specialist technical, financial, insurance and legal advice. The availability and participation of such advisors will usually be a prerequisite for attracting private sector financing on competitive terms. Until expertise is developed locally, China and other more advanced economies will be vital sources of such expertise – host governments will need to recognise their importance and limit barriers to their participation (including visa and working rules).
